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Abstract 
An increasing number of planners have explored the implication of Coase Theorem for planning 
theory and practice. As there are often a large and dispersed number of actors involved in planning issues, 
the application of ‘Pure’ Coasian solutions has proved to be limited. However, some studies argue that 
when the conditions for a ‘Pure’ Coasian solution do not exist, ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions may still be 
achievable. This paper examines how, when conditions of ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions are available, local 
authorities in Switzerland use Land Improvement Syndicates (LIS) as a policy instrument in order to 
achieve negotiated solutions in relation to development processes involving multiple landowners. With a 
syndicate in the commune of Cheseaux as an illustrative example, the paper analyses how this policy 
instrument has been utilised to reduce transaction costs, correct information asymmetries, and clarify 
property rights. The focus has been on an interpretation of the Coasian Theorem that identifies attempts 
to reduce transaction costs and clarify property rights as the main roles of governments or local 
authorities. 
Keywords: Land Improvement Syndicates (LIS), Planning Policy Instruments, Land Readjustment, 
Coase Theorem, Transaction Costs, Property Rights. 
 
1. Introduction 
While markets are usually good platforms for the organisation of economic activities, they do not 
necessarily lead to optimal outcomes, and often fail to efficiently allocate resources (Mankiw, 2011). 
There are different types of market failures, including: inter alia, externalities, information asymmetries, 
non-competitive markets, transaction costs, inadequate assignments of property rights, and public goods. 
Arising from the need to correct market failures, government interventions in the form of introducing 
policies have been justified by Pigovian welfare economics (Lai, 1997). Arthur Pigou (1920) suggested the 
levying of additional taxes on a good/activity that is generating negative externalities in order to correct 
a market failure. Pigou’s contribution was to introduce ‘a surrogate price’ in a perfectly competitive 
economy, through a per-unit charge, equal to the marginal external cost at the optimal level of pollution 
(Sandmo, 2008). Ronald Coase (1937, 1960), winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 
1991, presented an alternative to Pigou’s pricing policy, emphasising the role of property rights in 
internalising externalities, known as ‘Coase Theorem’. According to the Coase Theorem, people can reach 
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efficient solutions concerning the issues caused by externalities if, with well-established property rights 
and zero transaction costs, they can negotiate the exchange of rights to perform activities that cause 
externalities and are affected by externalities, regardless of the initial allocation of resources. 
The Coase Theorem implies that from an efficiency perspective, government interventions are not 
always desirable (Cooter, 1998), so long as the conditions of a ‘Pure’ Coasian solution are met, i.e. the 
transaction costs of exchange are nil and property rights are well-defined and freely tradeable. 
Nevertheless, ‘Pure’ Coasian solutions are rare (Lai, 1994, Sorensen, 1994), if existent in actuality, given 
that real world property rights are often not adequately assigned or transferable, information is 
inadequate or asymmetric, and transaction costs are high. These impeding conditions apply particularly 
to situations involving several actors. In line with the second-best theory (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956, 
Blackorby, 1990, Jones and Cullis, 1993), Clinch et al. (2008) argue that when the conditions of a ‘Pure’ 
Coasian solution do not exist, ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions may still be achievable. In other words, whilst 
the first-best solution (i.e. a ‘Pure’ Coasian solution) is often not viable, a second- or third-best solution, 
(i.e. an ‘Impure’ Coasian solution) may be a more practical approach. An ‘Impure’ Coasian solution is 
realisable through the intervention of a third party (e.g. local authorities or intermediaries) in situations 
where: 1) property rights are not clearly initially assigned but can be clarified; 2) property rights can be 
traded; 3) transaction costs are high but can be reduced; and 4) a reduction in information asymmetry 
between parties is possible. In this interpretation, the key role of government intervention is to designate 
and enforce well-defined and tradable property rights, and to minimise transaction costs. 
An increasing number of planners and economists have identified the relevance of the Coase 
Theorem in the resolution of planning and development issues (Lai and Hung, 2008, Lai and Lorne, 2006, 
Lai and Lorne, 2013, Lai et al., 2015, Lai, 2014, Webster and Wu, 2001, Webster, 1998, Webster and Lai, 
2003b, Fischel, 2015, Slaev, 2016, Gurran et al., 2018). Using the Coase Theorem, some researchers have 
challenged the appropriateness of zoning as a primary policy instrument within the dominant traditional 
regulatory approach in land use planning (Pearce, 1981, Lai, 1997, Webster, 1998, Clinch et al., 2008). 
These researchers consider the property rights approach resulting from the Coasian Theorem as an 
alternative to zoning in order to regulate externalities arising from land-use markets. Coase (1960) also 
uses zoning as an example where regulations have made matters worse. Holcombe (2013) puts forward 
contractual agreements as a means of maximising potential gains among parties directly affected by 
externalities. Slaev and Collier (2018) highlight the relevance of Coasian approaches for the establishment 
of individual responsibilities, and thus the efficient and sustainable management of natural resources.  
‘Pure’ Coasian solutions might only be available for minor planning issues, for example in addressing 
the conflict of interests between two neighbours in the use or development of their properties. In most 
planning and development issues, the ‘Invariance’ version of Coase Theorem (Lai, 1997) is not achievable. 
Since there are a large and dispersed number of actors involved and/or affected, clarifying development 
rights is subject to negotiations, information is asymmetric, and the potential for rent-seeking behaviours 
and opportunism is present. Nevertheless, using two examples in Ireland, Clinch et al. (2008) argue that 
an ‘Impure’ Coasian solution can be realised even in major planning issues (i.e. where there are large 
numbers of people affected by planning decisions), if people can be represented by either local planning 
authorities and public representatives (i.e. a form of government intervention) or representative 
community groups. Given the unlikelihood of achieving an agreement with all parties in large 
communities, the involvement of individuals or groups who can represent such communities is essential. 
While the direct application of Coasian solutions to planning theory and practice has been limited, it seems 
that some planning authorities have used ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions, perhaps unknowingly, in different 
jurisdictions. 
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This paper aims to examine the conditions that provide for the use of ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions 
through analysis of a Swiss policy instrument, Land Improvement Syndicates (LIS), which is used to 
facilitate land development processes involving multiple landowners. Within Land Improvement 
Syndicates, local authorities facilitate the establishment of an assembly of landowners who make 
decisions related to the development of their properties, as well as other development-related issues 
within a defined area. This paper explains how Swiss planners utilise the LIS to facilitate agreements 
amongst landowners by bringing landowners together, setting-out ground rules on collective decision-
making processes, providing reliable information for involved actors in an equal manner, economising on 
planning and development costs, and in the clarifying and re-allocating of development rights. Through 
the lens of the Coasian Theorem, we argue that the main role of local authorities in the LIS process is to 
minimise transaction costs and facilitate the re-allocation of property rights. Conceptually, this paper is in 
line with previous studies on the Coase Theorem in planning literature, more specifically the works of 
Clinch et al. (2008) on ‘Pure’ and ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions in planning and Lai (1997) on property rights 
justifications for planning. The paper is structured as follows: First, it discusses the Coase Theorem and its 
two main theories of transaction costs and property rights. This is followed by LIS background and 
mechanisms. Finally, using an illustrative example, the paper analyses how Swiss communal authorities 
use LIS to achieve ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions in a land development process involving multiple 
landowners. 
 
2. Coase Theorem: Transaction Costs and Property Rights 
Through a series of examples in his seminal work The Problem of Social Cost, Coase (1960) proposed 
that if property rights are well-defined and transaction costs remain low, agents can exchange rights in 
order to improve their mutual welfare, regardless of who owns the property rights. This work was a 
further development of his previous path-breaking article, The Nature of the Firm, in which Coase (1937) 
introduced the concept of transaction costs and explained how organisations reduce the costs of using 
the pricing mechanism. Arguing that incompletely defined property rights and subsequent transaction 
costs are significant to externalities, Coase (1960) contended that government intervention cannot be 
justified due to the presence of externalities per se. Rather, the need for government intervention arises 
from the existence of high transaction costs that undermine attempts to rearrange and reallocate 
property rights (or what Coase refers to as the legal rights or entitlements in property) and hinder 
internalising externalities. In a world of positive transaction costs, the initial allocation of rights and the 
associated entitlement-prescribing behaviour between actors related to these rights affect the allocation 
of resources: this is the corollary to the Coase Theorem. The allocation of entitlements through market 
interventions is of significance as defining, exchanging, and enforcing property rights are acts that are 
accompanied by costs. In this section, the two concepts of transaction costs and property rights, key to 
understanding the Coase Theorem, are further discussed. 
Transaction costs are the non-production costs of an exchange (Webster and Lai, 2003a, Shahab et 
al., 2018a, Hou et al., 2019). They arise because of information uncertainty and as a result of the actions 
that transactors must take to manage for this uncertainty (Williamson, 1998, Shahab and Allam, 2019). 
There are different interpretations in regards to the concept of transaction costs (McCann et al., 2005, 
Shahab et al., 2019). Ranging from being considered as ‘the cost of exchanging ownership titles’ (Demsetz, 
1969) to definitions such as Coase’s (1960), costs are always present when carrying out market 
transactions. Klaes (2008) distinguishes three categories in defining transaction costs: monetary, 
relational, and institutional. The first, a narrow interpretation from the perspective of neoclassical 
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tradition in monetary conception, considers transaction costs as direct monetary costs arising due to the 
use of intermediary services when an agent engages in a market transaction. The second is a relational 
interpretation, based on the market micro-structural models concerning the interactions between 
involved parties. This interpretation concerns the way in which agents interact with one another beyond 
price signals, and the supply and demand dimensions of microeconomics. Finally, an institutional 
interpretation considers transaction costs to be an important component of institutional economics and 
analysis. This interpretation broadens the scope of transaction costs to include costs incurred in defining, 
establishing, maintaining, and transferring property rights (Allen, 1991, McCann et al., 2005). Defining and 
maintaining land property rights, for instance, requires various transaction-cost-generating activities such 
as conducting surveys, preparing titles, and establishing the necessary legal and bureaucratic 
infrastructure. This paper employs the institutional interpretation of transaction costs. 
Property can be defined as “a claim to a benefit (or income) stream”, and property rights as “a claim 
to a benefit stream that some higher body -usually the state- will agree to protect through the assignment 
of duty to others who may covet, or somehow interfere with, the benefit stream” (Bromley, 1992, 4). 
Based on this definition, well-defined property rights require the possibility of exclusion of non-holders, 
the existence of clear rights assigned to right holders, and the protection of rights by higher authorities. 
Excludability allows the owner to exclude others from using the rights of a resource. Achieving a 
comprehensive assignment of property rights entails clearly defined ownership of all resources, and 
shared knowledge of the respective entitlements (Hanley et al., 2013). Such assignment also involves 
attributing clear liabilities over externalities and providing accurate information about their incidence and 
value (Webster and Lai, 2003b). Clear liabilities over externalities provides agents incentive to deploy 
resources in an efficient manner, and thus maximise welfare (Webster, 2005). Unclear liabilities or 
insufficient information, on the other hand, results in unexploited gains and rent dissipation. Welfare 
maximisation also requires property rights to be transferable (Hanley et al., 2013). Transferability provides 
the possibility of selling property rights to others (Whitten and Bennett, 2005). According to De Soto 
(2000), the transferability and fungibility of property rights occurs through their formalisation and 
integration into legally recognised registration systems. Such a registration system accounts for existing 
rights and contributes to their enforcement by securing titles from seizure or encroachment by others. By 
establishing and recognising the registration system and by defining property rights in the law, public 
authorities legitimise the content of rights and provide ‘legal mechanisms of adjudication and 
enforcement’ (Hodgson, 2015, 684). The contractual uncertainties which are an inherent characteristic of 
contractual assignments of property rights can be overcome through these legal mechanisms (Deakin et 
al., 2017, Webster, 2005). 
 
3. Swiss Land Improvement Syndicates (LIS): Background and Mechanisms 
Initial introduction of LIS by cantonal authorities arose from the need to adapt agricultural land 
plots for modern machinery in Switzerland (Courdesse, 2014). Based on the 1951 Federal Law on 
Agriculture and article 704 of the Civil Code, federal authorities supported agricultural land readjustment 
and collective infrastructure provision (e.g. roads and drainages) through the creation of public law 
corporations. The Canton of Vaud implemented these changes in the 1961 Land Betterment Act (LBA). In 
1987, the canton modified article 4 of the LBA, and article 55 of the Cantonal Planning Act (CPA), in order 
to extend LIS to urban areas. In this way, the instrument incorporated planning aspects and could address 
various land management and development issues. In particular, these policy instruments have been used 
in the Canton of Vaud in cases where multiple landowners were involved and where there was a need to 
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reach an agreement regarding the allocation of development rights and/or future land use (Weber et al., 
2011). Further, LIS have been applied where property subdivisions were deemed inappropriate or 
fragmented. As primarily land readjustment tools, LIS are comparable with land readjustment policy 
instruments in other countries: in the Netherlands (van der Krabben and Lenferink, 2018, Muñoz Gielen, 
2016, van der Krabben and Needham, 2008), Germany (Home, 2007), Spain (Gozalvo Zamorano and 
Muñoz Gielen, 2017), Portugal (Condessa et al., 2015, Almeida et al., 2018), Turkey (Uzun, 2009), Israel 
(Alterman, 2007), Egypt (Soliman, 2017), India (Byahut, 2014), and China (Li and Li, 2007). The role of 
planners and local authorities in relation to these policy instruments varies depending on the planning 
and legal systems in different jurisdictions. For example, in Germany, planners take a rather passive role 
in development processes, whilst planners in the Netherlands hold a very active role as they are directly 
involved in buying and developing the land in the Dutch market-oriented planning (Hartmann and Spit, 
2015). 
With the use of LIS, local authorities in the Canton of Vaud aim to incorporate land readjustments, 
zoning changes, and infrastructure provisions within a single instrument (Prélaz-Droux, 2009). Land 
Improvement Syndicates bring landowners together through the establishment of a landowner assembly 
which can make decisions on new property subdivisions of a defined area, future land uses, the allocation 
of development rights, and the distribution of costs (i.e. the costs of infrastructure provision, planning 
and design, relevant surveys, etc.) and profits such as added land value (Tillemans et al., 2011). Syndicates 
which have been implemented in the Canton of Vaud have been mostly located in urban fringes (typically 
agricultural areas near cities/towns) and include areas ranging from 10 to 400 hectares. The number of 
landowners who were involved in these syndicates has ranged from 12 to 170 people. Outside of the 
landowner assembly, a syndicate consists of three committees (Schneider et al., 2003): a steering 
committee, a management committee, and an experts committee. Each committee has certain roles and 
its members are selected by the landowner assembly. The steering committee executes the decisions of 
the assembly, such as negotiating and contracting with lenders and developers, and making payments. 
The management committee audits the financial accounts of the syndicate. The experts committee 
conducts relevant surveys and valuations and prepares new property subdivisions, which take into 
account the input of landowners and local authorities. 
The introduction of LIS as a policy choice can be triggered by either a bottom-up or top-down 
approach (art. 85d LBA and art. 50 CPA). This means that either landowners bring forward their 
development intentions to communal authorities, or cantonal and/or communal authorities identify 
current or potential issues concerning land, development, or public infrastructure. The syndicates 
executed in the Canton of Vaud have, for the most part, been initiated when the majority of landowners 
in the area voluntarily decided upon the creation of a Land Improvement Syndicate. When an overriding 
public interest exists, local authorities may also impose LIS as a policy solution (art. 27 LBA). Conducting a 
feasibility study is the first step in determining the suitability of a Land Improvement Syndicate to address 
identified issues. To do so, interested landowners or local authorities hire planners and surveyors in order 
to gain insight into the preferences of public and private sectors involved, prepare a preliminary plan, and 
make a provisional estimate of the costs and gains. When all landowners are willing to proceed with 
development and have agreed on the proposed changes, they may sign voluntary contractual agreements. 
However, when the desired changes are complex or contentious, a majority of landowners can form an 
assembly and vote on the creation of a Land Improvement Syndicate. This is followed by the election of 
representatives for the three syndicate committees (i.e. steering committee, management committee, 
and experts committee) and voting on the timing and details of activities and finances. At this stage, a 
development plan and new property boundaries need to be prepared (the former is normally carried out 
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by local authorities, while hired surveyors and planners prepare the latter). Local authorities call for public 
hearings and meetings regarding the development plan and the new property boundaries. In the absence 
of opposition, the landowner assembly approves the new property subdivisions, and local authorities vote 
on the development plan. The steering committee then takes out loans in order to finance land servicing, 
and contracts developers to deliver the service. The final step before dissolving the LIS is to 
proportionately divide planning and land development related costs among landowners. 
 
4. Derrière-le-Château Syndicate: An Illustrative Example 
Using the Syndicat Derrière-le-Château (Behind-the-Castle Syndicate) as an illustrative example of 
Land Improvement Syndicates in Switzerland, this section outlines how land policy objectives were 
achieved through the agreement of ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions. The Syndicat Derrière-le-Château, referred 
to as ‘the Syndicate’ in this paper, was initiated in the commune of Cheseaux, Canton of Vaud, in 2002. 
Cheseaux is a suburban commune in the district of Lausanne that had populations of 2,900 and 4,342 
inhabitants in 2002 and 2018 respectively. After a decade of population stagnation in the 1990s, the 
population of Cheseaux grew by about 50% while the population growth in the district of Lausanne over 
the last two decades was 15% (Viallon, 2017). The Syndicate area consisted of 18.2 hectares and included 
30 plots of land owned by 16 landowners. Approximately 14 hectares of the area were zoned as an 
intermediary zone1, while the rest of the area was zoned as farmland. As of 2001, a square metre of land 
located in an intermediary zone in the Syndicate area was valued at 20 Swiss Francs, while the same 
amount of space located in land zoned for farming was valued at 4 Swiss Francs. In 2014 at the dissolution 
of the Syndicate, seven landowners owned 17 plots of land of which 11.5 hectares were zoned as 
agricultural and 6.7 hectares were allocated for development (Figure 1). A square metre of land located 
in the development zone of the Syndicate area was valued at 250 Swiss Francs in 2003, and 800 Swiss 
Francs in 2014. The details of the formation and execution processes of the Syndicat Derrière-le-Château 
are presented by Shahab and Viallon (2019). The following sections show how the Cheseaux communal 
authorities used LIS to reduce transaction costs, rectify information asymmetries, and define and transfer 
property rights in a situation where the conditions of ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions were available: 1) 
transaction costs were high but could be reduced; 2) information between parties was inadequate and 
asymmetric—a condition which could have been reduced; 3) property rights were not initially clearly 
assigned, but could have been clarified; and 4) property rights could be traded. 
  
1. In the planning system in the Canton of Vaud, if land is zoned for ‘intermediary’ or ‘long-term 
development’, it often means that its status quo land use is agricultural with a non-binding political 
promise to rezone it as a ‘development zone’ in the future (over a period of 15 years). 
6 
 
                                                
Figure 1. The area of Derrière-le-Château Syndicate before and after the policy intervention 
 
Data sources: (Canton Vaud, 2015, Stutz, 1978, Besson and Courdesse, 1999, Marti and Courdesse, 2003) 
 
4.1. Reducing transaction costs 
Prior to the execution of the Syndicate, the area faced land use and development issues. The main 
issues were twofold: inappropriate property subdivisions for future development had created the need 
for land readjustments, and issues related to the building of a public school required land acquisition and 
zoning changes. Several voluntary contractual agreements were required to address the first issue as it 
was necessary for each landowner to negotiate with all neighbouring property owners. Achieving 
voluntary contractual agreements was considered impractical and involved lengthy negotiations which 
led in turn to high transaction costs. Concerning the second issue, local authorities needed to change the 
existing zoning plan for the plot of land designated for the development of the school. Given that the 
partial zoning change (i.e. rezoning the area solely to favour building the school) was unpopular among 
the landowners, the local authorities decided to modify the strategic plan of the area in a more 
comprehensive manner, rather than implementing a minor zoning change. The unpopularity of a partial 
zoning change was mainly due to the willingness of the landowners whose properties were located in the 
intermediary zone to modify the strategic plan in favour of the development of their properties. A partial 
zoning change would have created resistance to the project, generating high transaction costs. As a result, 
the Cheseaux communal authorities introduced a Land Improvement Syndicate as a policy choice, 
providing an alternative to rather unpopular and potentially costly options (such as voluntary contractual 
agreements and partial zoning changes). In this way, the introduction of LIS in Cheseaux per se can be 
seen as a policy intervention for the reduction of transaction costs. 
The Syndicate decreased transaction costs in three main ways: by bringing landowners together, 
economising on the costs and resources invested in the process, and setting out ground rules for the 
collective decision-making process. The Syndicate brought involved landowners together and provided 
them with an opportunity to collectively express their preferences. During the process of establishing 
constituting the assembly, some landowners opted out of the Syndicate and sold their properties to other 
interested landowners. A central reason for opting out was that these landowners owned small properties 
and were not willing to pay for the land development and planning expenses. In-line with the literature 
on policy-related transaction costs (Shahab et al., 2018c, McCann, 2013, Mettepenningen et al., 2011, 
Shahab et al., 2018b), transaction costs were reduced by the low number of transactors involved, along 
with the high level of homogeneity and common preferences among the actors. In addition, the Syndicate 
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allowed the property owners to economise on the costs involved in the process, including both time-
related costs and direct monetary expenses. For example, regarding time-related costs, the landowner 
assembly had the right to borrow funds from lenders for land servicing, resulting in a reduction of the 
time and effort each landowner needed to dedicate to securing the required funds. Similarly, for direct 
monetary expenses such as planning costs, land readjustment, land servicing, and infrastructure 
provision, the Syndicate decreased each landowner’s share, proportionally dividing costs between 
involved landowners. In order to lower transaction costs for the private-sector, the communal authorities 
incurred the costs of planning and a portion of infrastructure provision costs. 
The Syndicate facilitated negotiations between the landowners through the creation of several 
rules. One of the key rules was the ‘majority rule’; the landowner assembly made decisions based on a 
majority-voting rule, as defined in cantonal legislation (art. 25 LBA). As Buchanan and Tullock (1962) 
discussed in their seminal work, the majority rule is associated with lower decision-making costs, in 
contrast with the unanimity rule which is not only more costly, but is often unworkable in practice. 
Another rule used in the Syndicate was the one-person, one-vote rule, in which each landowner was 
entitled to one vote regardless of the size or value of their properties. Similar to the majority rule, this 
rule lowered transaction costs by making the process easier to understand and simpler to administer, 
balancing the bargaining power among the landowners, and reducing the risks of opportunism and rent-
seeking behaviours. The ‘equal treatment of the actors involved’ was another rule adopted by the 
Syndicate. For instance, the same unitary value was given to all existing land plots within the Syndicate 
area when computing the costs and benefits of the development and of related activities. This approach 
lowered transaction costs by simplifying costs and benefits calculations, building trust between actors, 
and limiting the risks of opportunistic behaviours. 
 
4.2. Correcting information asymmetries 
One of the key ways to reduce the transaction costs of land development processes is to provide 
adequate and accurate information in an equal and timely manner to all actors involved. The Syndicate 
mainly provided such information by: 1) preparing a feasibility study, 2) calling for public hearings, and 3) 
establishing committees. Completion of a feasibility study prior to the establishment of the Syndicate was 
a legal requirement which helped correct information asymmetries among involved actors. Local 
authorities hired private planning consultants and surveyors to carry out the study comprised of a draft 
of land use plan, a draft of new property boundaries, and a preliminary estimate of the potential costs 
and benefits associated with implementing the Syndicate. To do so, the experts met individually with all 
involved landowners to ask for their input and to determine their views on the development, and in 
particular, the establishment of the Syndicate. Conducting the feasibility study had several advantages; 1) 
it gave all interested parties a chance to express their opinions, needs, and expectations; 2) it established 
a better understanding of landowner preferences; 3) it promoted the shared knowledge and information 
among the involved parties; 4) it ensured sufficient information for all landowners in regards to the LIS 
procedures and the potential outcomes; and 5) it reduced the risks of future appeals. The private planning 
consultants and surveyors responsible for preparing the study had previously worked for the local 
authorities and for some of the landowners. This previous experience promoted trust and confidence in 
the information they provided. In addition to the feasibility study, the local authorities called for public 
hearings at various stages of the policy formation and execution process. These public hearings increased 
the transparency of the process, providing people living in the broader area with opportunities to voice 
their concerns and to remain informed. 
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The establishment of expert, steering, and management committees was another means of 
providing accurate and adequate information to the actors involved. The experts committee consisted of 
private planning consultants, surveyors, farmers, and notaries. A president and a secretary were members 
of the steering committee, while the management committee was comprised of accountants. These 
committees (particularly the experts committee) helped mediate the imperfect information and the 
uncertainty present in the process. In effect, they played important intermediary roles in the initiation 
and execution of the Syndicate. While intermediaries often emerge independently from planning policy 
instruments, the Syndicate created this intermediary role as an integral part of the policy design. There 
are various roles that intermediaries might play in policy instruments (Coggan et al., 2013, Benassi and Di 
Minin, 2009, Bendor, 2009, Gangadharan, 2000), from which it seems that the established committees 
held three main roles, including information/knowledge provider, broker, and clearinghouse. As 
information providers, the experts committee contributed specialist knowledge on land surveys, land 
readjustments, and property valuations. It also provided the landowner assembly with the relevant 
information concerning the sequence of activities of the LIS implementation process (e.g. conducting the 
feasibility study, calling for public hearings, design and planning), the rules and procedures of the LIS (e.g. 
voting rules and decision making processes), and the expected outcomes. Further, these committees 
played the role of brokers as they operated beyond the bounds of information providers. For instance, 
the steering committee conducted activities such as searching for developers and lenders and negotiating 
the contracts. The experts committee also acted as a broker, negotiating the development plan with the 
local authorities and aligning the preferences of landowners with land policy goals. Finally, to fulfil the 
clearinghouse role, the established committees ensured that the transactions took place as planned and 
that the involved actors fulfilled their obligations. For example, the management committee oversaw the 
calculation and schedule of the payments of relevant costs by the landowners and local authorities. The 
experts committee also prepared the titles for the newly shaped plots of land and recorded them in the 
land registry. 
 
4.3. Re-assigning and transferring property rights 
Local authorities took different actions within the Syndicate, attempting to reassign property rights 
and facilitate their transfer. Preparing a development plan, adjusting new property boundaries, and 
conducting land surveys and valuations were among the main actions taken. A condition for the successful 
re-assignment and transfer of property rights was the simultaneous coordination of these actions. 
Preparing a development plan and adjusting new property boundaries within the Syndicate required 
coordination between the local authorities and property owners. It also required concomitant execution 
of conformance checks, public hearings, votes, and legal approvals inherent in the use of zoning and land 
readjustment. Thus, the coordination and the simultaneous implementation of these actions clarified the 
content of property rights, restructured plot boundaries, secured the value of entitlements, and allowed 
for the transfer of rights among landowners. In sum, their use made the re-assignment and transfer of 
rights possible. The following paragraphs present each of the main actions taken. 
The preparation of a development plan was required to clarify existing development rights within 
the Syndicate. As mentioned earlier, about 14 hectares of the Syndicate area were zoned for long-term 
development, and the remaining 4 hectares were zoned as agricultural. However, zoning was not 
appropriate for the intended development, as it did not define clear densities, or planned access roads 
for future construction. Further, it covered only a portion of property subdivisions. As a consequence, 
development and infrastructure provision was costly, when possible, and landowners willing to develop 
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or sell their land faced high rent dissipation. To clarify landowner entitlements and adjust existing zoning 
regulations, landowners within the area chose to create a syndicate. The Syndicate implementation 
process entailed the preparation of a development plan tailored to the requirements of the area. For this 
purpose, the planners hired by the local authorities considered zoning regulations to be modified under 
the Syndicate (e.g. construction densities, public domain). They adjusted regulations on public spaces to 
the geographical attributes of the area (e.g. in terms of location, orientation, and design), and clarified 
landowner liabilities on parking and green spaces. Also, landowners used public hearings to interact 
directly with local authorities and negotiate the conditions of implementation of the development plan, 
such as the location of the constructible areas under the development plan. In sum, the development plan 
prepared under the Syndicate allowed for a closer involvement of landowners than in regular communal 
zoning schemes and clarified the content of entitlements, as it was tailored to local needs. As a result, 
landowner resources were allocated more efficiently and uncertainties on the definition of property rights 
reduced. 
In parallel with the preparation of the development plan, property boundaries needed to be 
adjusted, as existing subdivisions were unsuited for development (e.g. inadequate size, shape, or absence 
of access to roads). Under the Syndicate, the restructuring of property boundaries was dependent on a 
majority vote by landowners gathered as an assembly. In other words, the Syndicate temporarily removed 
the capacity to exclude non-holders, which is inherent in each individual entitlement, and granted it to all 
members of the Syndicate, acting as a collective decision-maker. Thus, landowners jointly decided on the 
restructuring of property boundaries under the rules of the Syndicate. Among these rules, landowners 
had to approve land values for all land plots. Such decision-making built on the previous experts 
committee work which had defined the value of entitlements through a land survey, and land valuation 
before and after zoning changes. Based on the valuation of entitlements approved by landowners, 
entitlements became fungible (De Soto, 2000), which in turn made possible the restructuring of property 
boundaries. Landowners engaged in the process voluntarily, because the benefits of the Syndicate 
outweighed the costs, i.e. the Syndicate permitted more productive land uses at a later stage. Legal 
remedies against the decisions of the assembly were available to all landowners. In the example 
considered, no landowner opposed any assembly decision. The new property subdivisions were spatially 
congruent with development rights allocated by the development plan. In sum, the Syndicate created a 
community of title-holders that rendered property rights temporarily fungible and prepared land for more 
productive uses at a later stage. 
Making property rights fungible required the protection of individual entitlement values. As the 
development plan elaborated under the Syndicate changed the value of plots of land (i.e. new rights were 
granted), landowner entitlements had to be secured throughout the entire process. To do so, the 
Syndicate used a calculation method that ensured the equal treatment of landowners. The principle of 
equal treatment is rooted in the Swiss Federal Constitution (art. 8), which prescribes the equal treatment 
of individuals and, as a corollary, proscribes discrimination. In the Syndicate, the landowner assembly 
delegated the calculation of the value of entitlements to the experts committee, which assessed the value 
of each plot of land within the syndicate area. Based on the proposed development plan, the experts 
committee conducted a second land value assessment of the entire Syndicate area. To calculate the new 
value of individual entitlements, the experts committee divided the new value of the sum of entitlements 
by the prior value of the sum of entitlements. Such a calculation allowed for a proportionate increase in 
the value of all entitlements, and a subsequent division of costs associated with the Syndicate (e.g. land 
servicing, administrative costs). In Syndicat Derrière-le-Château, the increased value of properties 
resulting from the development process (i.e. betterment or planning gain) remained in the hands of the 
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landowners, as there was no legislation or policy for public value capturing in place at the time2. As 
previously mentioned, landowners possessed a legal remedy against any attribution of value considered 
unequal or unfair. For the Syndicate, these calculation methods proved successful for the definition of 
land values. 
Having clearly established the new value of entitlements, the Syndicate organised the transfer of 
entitlements among landowners. Transferring property rights to their respective owners implied a re-
allocation of land plots taking landowner preferences into consideration (e.g. in terms of location, land 
use). Depending on landowner interests and/or professional activity, participants could favour agricultural 
land, buildable land, or financial compensation. As the demand for constructible land is often higher, the 
transfer of agricultural land to landowners can be problematic. For example, all landowners might favour 
constructible land, requiring the division of agricultural land among landowners who have no interest in 
the land. In cases where one or more landowners receive all of the farmland, compensation equal to the 
value of their entitlement might be required. In the example considered, the existence of landowners with 
different preferences allowed for the matching of suggested land uses with landowner interests, and with 
the value of their entitlements. Thus, no major financial compensation needed to be paid to landowners, 
and existing rights were transferred in accordance with the value of the new land uses proposed by the 
development plan. Hence, the decision-making process triggered by the Syndicate transferred 
entitlements in accordance with the preferences of landowners. The result was a substantial increase of 
production, as the land zoned constructible under the development plan was developed, and agricultural 
land was cultivated in a rational way. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The Coase Theorem affirms that, in dealing with externalities, where transaction costs are negligible 
and property rights can be clearly attributed, market transactions can lead to more efficient outcomes 
than state interventions, regardless of the initial allocation of resources. In other words, the Coase 
Theorem asserts that it is not always necessary to regulate externalities if there is a possibility of clarifying 
property rights and minimising transaction costs. As neither zero transaction costs nor fully defined and 
tradable property rights exist in the real world, the Theorem is concerned with accounting for the costs 
of coordination and the definition of property rights, and the role of government in reducing these costs 
and clarifying property rights. Through analysis of the Swiss policy instrument Land Improvement 
Syndicates, the intent of this paper is to inquire into the conditions necessary for ‘Impure’ Coasian 
solutions. LIS are designed to assist local authorities and landowners where property rights are 
inadequately defined, a re-allocation of development rights is necessary, and the development process 
affects multiple landowners. We used the Syndicat Derrière-le-Château in the commune of Cheseaux, 
Canton of Vaud, as an illustrative example.  
This study shows that the Syndicate effected a reduction in transaction costs arising from the land 
development processes. In comparison with alternative policy choices, such as voluntary contractual 
agreements, the Syndicate appeared to reduce the time and effort landowners invested in the 
negotiations concerning the adjusting of property subdivisions and in changing zoning and land uses. As 
opposed to partial rezoning, this instrument proved to be a more popular solution among landowners. 
The Syndicate also brought landowners together by creating a landowner assembly, which had the effect 
2. The 2014 revision of the Federal Spatial Planning Act (art. 5) introduced a mandatory 20% tax on value 
increments. 
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of reducing the number of transactors involved. The Syndicate also assisted the landowners in 
economising time and monetary resources by proportionately distributing costs and borrowing funds on 
their behalf. Further, the ground rules for decision-making within the landowner assembly facilitated 
negotiations among landowners: the majority vote and one-person, one-vote rules reduced decision-
making costs and simplified the voting process. In addition, application of the equal treatment principle 
elevated the trust of participants in the process. 
 The Syndicate also facilitated negotiations among landowners by providing accurate and adequate 
information. The feasibility study provided landowners with the possibility to express their opinions and 
develop a better understanding of their preferences. Clarification of impending LIS procedures and 
potential outcomes lowered the risks of future appeals. Through the establishment of committees, the 
Syndicate mediated information asymmetries and uncertainties among participants. They provided 
specialist insights on rules, procedures and land values, acted as a broker when searching for developers 
and lenders, and aligned landowner preferences with local and broader land policy goals. The committees 
also fulfilled the role of a clearinghouse, securing payments and preparing land titles. 
Further, the Syndicate clarified the assignment of property rights and facilitated their 
transferability. In close collaboration, local authorities, committees, and landowners prepared a 
development plan tailored to local requirements and were able to reassign the content of entitlements. 
The Syndicate also adjusted property boundaries in order to adapt plots to land development. This land 
readjustment was based on the fungibility of property titles, the values of which were assessed by a land 
survey both before and after Syndicate execution. The Syndicate temporarily removed the excludability 
of individual property rights by granting the right to make decisions on the use of the Syndicate area to 
all members of the landowner assembly. The landowners agreed to these modifications because: 
compensatory payments ensured all entitlements matched landowner claims; the transfer of property 
titles occurred in accordance with the preferences of landowners; the values of individual entitlements 
were protected; and the benefits of the Syndicate outweighed the costs. These benefits featured 
significant gains for landowners. In the case of Syndicat Derrière-le-Château, the development process 
increased land values by 287%, compared to the previous values, although no value capturing instruments 
were in place at the time of the Syndicate. These gains were sufficient to allow for the implementation of 
value capturing instruments, such as the 2014 tax on added land value created by zoning (art. 5 of Federal 
Spatial Planning Act-FSPA), without challenging the profitability of the development.  
Land improvement syndicates facilitate landowner agreement by bringing landowners together, 
setting forth ground rules on collective decision-making processes, providing reliable and equitable access 
to information for involved actors, economising on planning and development costs, and clarifying and 
re-allocating property rights. The results hold significant implications for planning theory and practice. LIS 
provide alternative means to more direct forms of government intervention, internalising externalities 
and coping with market failures. In contrast with Pigovian approaches, which are often associated with 
high preparation and monitoring costs and can result in implementation gaps (Viallon et al., 2019, 
Schweizer, 2015), LIS grant landowners legal mechanisms for the reduction of transaction costs and the 
clarification of property rights, with limited government intervention. In these ways, LIS provide effective 
means for the realisation of ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions. ‘Pure’ Coasian approaches use contractual 
agreements that may prove unworkable where large number of parties are involved (Lai, 1997, Clinch et 
al., 2008). Alternatively, LIS constitute a landowner assembly which uses one-person, one-vote and 
majority rules to overcome situations where disagreements among multiple landowners may block 
decision-making processes. Consequently, landowners can reach an agreement and decide upon the re-
allocation of property rights. Both implications could benefit from further analysis. In particular, more 
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attention should be paid to the formal and informal mechanisms that 1) provide information to 
participants, 2) frame negotiations between landowners and authorities, and 3) define decision-making 
rules in planning processes, as they have a substantial impact on transaction costs and on the clarification 
of property rights. Further, a discussion of LIS rules and procedures in light of Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) 
design principles for a sustainable management of common pool resources may prove fruitful to 1) 
account for similarities and differences between LIS and ‘traditional’ commons, and 2) cross-fertilise 
theoretical insights from property rights and common pool resource theories. 
Beyond the transaction costs and property rights considerations discussed above, the institutional 
design of LIS promotes the participation of landowners in land development processes through various 
means. Collective decision-making rules (e.g. one-person, one-vote) applied to the landowner assembly 
create a forum for discussion for landowners, while making collective choices more equitable. 
Participation is also open to non-landowners through popular votes on the local development plan, in 
conformity with Swiss legislation on spatial planning (art. 4 FSPA and art. 28 CPA). In various stages of LIS 
execution, public-sector planners must call for public hearings, in which local residents (i.e. any resident 
living in the jurisdiction including non-landowners) may inquire into LIS decisions on (art. 85p LBA): the 
definition of LIS areas, initial and final land values, infrastructure provision plans, infrastructure cost 
divisions among landowners, and infrastructure provision plans. These decisions are subject to public 
inquiry and appeal. Further, local authorities involved in the process act as representatives for local 
residents. This is in line with the literature on the planning decisions and ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions that 
involve large numbers of stakeholders (see Clinch et al. 2008). Further, LIS create more transparency in 
land development processes, compared to contractual agreements between landowners or between 
landowners and local authorities. Therefore, one outcome stemming from the execution of LIS is that 
collective decision-making rules and public scrutiny might constitute efficient and legitimate means for 
the reallocation of rights in contentious situations. Applying these principles to a larger number of land 
development projects can contribute to an increase in the transparency of land development processes, 
confer more legitimacy on land use policy, foster accountability to the public, and allow for the 
achievement of desirable policy outcomes. 
This study analyses one of the executed LIS and has the advantages and limitations of a single case-
study methodology. This approach provided the researchers with an in-depth understanding of the 
initiation and execution processes of Syndicat Derrière-le-Château. Despite the analytical generalisability 
of the arguments in this paper, we acknowledge that the empirical results of this study might not be fully 
applicable to all executed LIS in Switzerland or to land readjustment instruments in other countries. 
Nevertheless, we believe that some key empirical results of this study are replicable in other LIS in the 
Canton of Vaud, given they are executed under the same federal and cantonal legislations and follow the 
same policy procedures. Syndicat Derrière-le-Château is a typical example of LIS in the Canton of Vaud, 
which may increase the relevance of this study as it involves, for example, land use changes, inappropriate 
property subdivisions resulting in the need for land readjustment, disagreements among landowners, and 
provision of infrastructure. It is worth noting that most development processes in Switzerland privilege 
contractual agreements, and the use of LIS is marginal. As noted by Alterman (2012), land policy 
instruments, such as LIS in Switzerland, remain ‘sleeping beauties’ in advanced economies. 
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